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Abstract 
This paper provides an initial analysis of the EU ETS based on the 
installation-level data for verified emissions and allowance allocations in 
the first trading year. Those data, released on May 15, 2006, and 
subsequent updates revealed that CO2 emissions were about 4% lower 
than the allocated allowances. The main objective of the paper is to shed 
light on the extent to which over-allocation and abatement have taken 
place in 2005. We propose a measure by which over-allocation can be 
judged and provide estimates of abatement based on emissions data and 
indicators of economic activity as well as trends in energy and carbon 
intensity. Finally, we discuss the insights and implications that emerge 
from this tentative assessment. 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
On May 15, 2006, the European Commission officially released installation-level data 
for verified emissions and allowance allocations for 2005, the first of the three years of 
the trial period for the European Union’s CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). 
                                                 
1 Ellerman is Senior Lecturer at the Sloan School of Management at MIT. Barbara Buchner is Senior 
Researcher at FEEM and a visitor at MIT during the preparation of this paper. From January 2007, she is 
Energy and Environmental Analyst at the International Energy Agency. We are greatly endebted to 
continuing discussions with a number of observers and analysts of the EU ETS and to comments received 
in response to a presentation of this paper to the WIFO-MIT Global Change Forum held in Vienna in 
October 2006. Our greatest debt is to Angela Koeppl from the Austrian Institute of Economic Research 
(WIFO) in Vienna and Stefan Schleicher from the Wegener Center for Climate and Global Change at the 
University of Graz whose initial compilation of the Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) data, 
subsequently updated by us, made this evaluation possible. The usual disclaimer applies to the 
responsibility of all who have helped us for the interpretations of the data that we present here. 
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Those data and subsequent updates revealed that CO2 emissions were about 80 million 
tons or 4% lower than the number of allowances distributed to installations for 2005 
emissions. This long position has been interpreted as evidence of over-allocation, 
something that had been suspected but which seemed belied by the higher than expected 
prices that had prevailed before the release of these data. While over-allocation cannot be 
dismissed as a possibility, a long position is not per se evidence of over-allocation. 
Installations that had abated in order to sell allowances or to bank them for use in later 
years would appear in these data as long. In fact, it would be impossible based on a 
simple comparison of allocations and emissions at the installation level to determine 
whether a long position indicated over-allocation or abatement. Hence, the question 
posed by the title of this paper. 
The rest of the paper is organized in four sections. The first presents and comments on 
the 2005 data as well as the price movements associated with the release of these data. 
Although a full discussion of European Union Allowance (EUA) pricing is beyond the 
scope of this paper, an understanding of what EUA prices did—and perhaps more 
importantly what they did not do—bears on any discussion of over-allocation and 
abatement. The next section addresses over-allocation and proposes a measure by which 
over-allocation can be judged. Then, we turn to abatement and provide some estimates of 
abatement based on the 2005 emissions data and economy-level indicators of economic 
activity and trends in energy and carbon intensity. The last section concludes. 
II. THE 2005 DATA AND EUA PRICES 
 
Table 1 provides the 2005 installation-level data aggregated by member states ordered 
by the size of the 2005 allocation.  The last two columns indicate the extent to which the 
installations in each member state are as a whole either long or short both in absolute and 
percentage terms. 
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Table 1. A general picture of the EU ETS in its first year 
 Allocation 2005
Mt CO2 
Emissions 2005
Mt CO2 
Difference 
Mt CO2 
Difference 
Percentage 
TOTAL 2,087.9 2,006.6 81.3 3.9% 
Germany 495.0 474.0 20.9 4.2% 
Poland 235.6 205.4 30.1 12.8% 
Italy 215.8 225.3 -9.5 -4.4% 
UK 206.0 242.5 -36.4 -17.7% 
Spain 172.1 182.9 -10.8 -6.3% 
France 150.4 131.3 19.1 12.7% 
Czech Republic 96.9 82.5 14.5 14.9% 
Netherlands 86.5 80.4 6.1 7.1% 
Greece 71.1 71.3 -0.1 -0.2% 
Belgium 58.3 55.4 3.0 5.1% 
Finland 44.7 33.1 11.6 25.9% 
Denmark 37.3 26.5 10.8 29.0% 
Portugal 36.9 36.4 0.5 1.3% 
Austria 32.4 33.4 -1.0 -3.0% 
Slovakia 30.5 25.2 5.2 17.2% 
Hungary 30.2 26.0 4.2 13.9% 
Sweden 22.3 19.3 3.0 13.3% 
Ireland 19.2 22.4 -3.2 -16.4% 
Estonia 16.7 12.6 4.1 24.6% 
Lithuania 13.5 6.6 6.9 51.1% 
Slovenia 9.1 8.7 0.4 4.6% 
Latvia 4.1 2.9 1.2 29.9% 
Luxembourg 3.2 2.6 0.6 19.4% 
 Source: Own calculations based on data provided by the CITL.  
A number of comments need to be made concerning these data. First, they are not 
complete. A number of installations in some countries have yet to report and the entries 
for some installations have changed since first reported in May 2006. The figures 
presented here are updated through 31 October 2006, as of which date information on 
10,046 installations in 23 Member States had been made available on the CITL. 2 These 
installations account for 88% of the installations and 96% of the EUAs allocated directly 
to installations. The remaining installations are small and their emissions are not likely to 
change the over-all length of EU ETS in 2005 significantly.3  
                                                 
2 Data for Cyprus and Malta, which account for 0.3% of EU allowances and emissions, had not been  
reported to the CITL when this paper was being prepared. Subsequent references to EU23 refer to data 
without Cyprus and Malta.  
3 The main uncertainty involves Poland. In July 2006, the Commission released data for 459 installations 
(out of 1088) in Poland that received 90% of Poland’s annual allocation, which indicated a surplus equal to 
12.8% of the allowances allocated to those installations. The figures reported in Table 1 for Poland 
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Second, the allowance totals for member states reflect the allowances distributed to 
installations in 2005 and not the annual average of all allowances that will be distributed 
during 2005-07. European Union Allowances (EUAs) reserved for new entrants, 
auctions, or early action awards are not included and in many cases these reserves have 
not yet been released. Also, the allowances received by installations in the first year are 
not necessarily one third of the total to be distributed to installations in the first trading 
period. Denmark, for instance, made annual distributions in the three years of 40%, 30%, 
and 30%.  
Third, and finally, these data do not indicate the amount of purchases and sales made 
by specific facilities, although they do have implications for trading patterns. All that is 
indicated is the difference between the 2005 allocation and 2005 verified emissions. 
Installations that are shown to be short, that is, with 2005 emissions greater than the 2005 
EUA allocation, can be presumed to have purchased or otherwise acquired EUAs from 
other installations (or from their own 2006 endowments) to be in compliance. 
Conversely, installations that are revealed to be long would have EUAs for sale, but that 
doesn’t mean that they were made available to the market or transferred to another 
facility having common ownership, although obviously many had been sold or 
transferred in order for the installations that were short to be in compliance.   
The release of the emissions data had a marked effect on EUA prices, as shown by the 
sharp break in the price of all maturities of EUAs that can be observed in late April 2006 
depicted on Figure 1. Following announcements by the Netherlands and the Czech 
Republic on Tuesday, April 25 that their emissions were 7% and 15% below the 
respective allocations to installations, EUA prices fell by about 10%. Subsequent 
announcements from the Walloon region of Belgium, France, and Spain revealing 
similarly long positions for the first two and a smaller than expected shortage in Spain led 
to a closing spot price on Friday April 28 of  € 13.35, 54% below the closing spot price 
                                                                                                                                                 
extrapolate this percent surplus to the total allocation to Polish installations. However, as of Oct 31, 2006, 
the CITL data show 481 installations with data for both allowances and emissions that constitute 60% of 
total allowances and which indicate a surplus of 19%. Extrapolating this percentage to the whole would add 
another 14 million tons to Poland’s and the EU surplus. This would increase the EU surplus in Table 1 
from 3.9% to 4.6%. Like most analysts and until a more complete accounting is available, we rely on the 
Commission’s more comprehensive totals where an aggregate number is required, such as in Table 1, and 
on the CITL when installation data are needed in our analysis.  
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on Monday, April 24, of € 29.20. There were further, less severe fluctuations of price 
until the complete data were released on May 15; however, the essential adjustment was 
made in these four days and after May 15 the spot price remained close to € 15 until late 
September when a further less pronounced adjustment occurred.    
Figure 1. Price developments on the EU carbon market (OTC Market, November 2005 to 
October 2006) 
29.20
8.95
21.75
10.95
20.25
17.90
32.85
15.40
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
34
01
/1
1/
20
05
11
/1
1/
20
05
23
/1
1/
20
05
05
/1
2/
20
05
15
/1
2/
20
05
28
/1
2/
20
05
09
/0
1/
20
06
19
/0
1/
20
06
31
/0
1/
20
06
10
/0
2/
20
06
22
/0
2/
20
06
06
/0
3/
20
06
16
/0
3/
20
06
28
/0
3/
20
06
07
/0
4/
20
06
21
/0
4/
20
06
04
/0
5/
20
06
16
/0
5/
20
06
26
/0
5/
20
06
07
/0
6/
20
06
19
/0
6/
20
06
29
/0
6/
20
06
11
/0
7/
20
06
21
/0
7/
20
06
02
/0
8/
20
06
14
/0
8/
20
06
24
/0
8/
20
06
05
/0
9/
20
06
15
/0
9/
20
06
27
/0
9/
20
06
09
/1
0/
20
06
19
/1
0/
20
06
31
/1
0/
20
06
Pr
ic
e 
[€
/to
n]
Spot 2006 2007 2008  
 Source: Own calculations based on data from Point Carbon.  
This price “collapse” demonstrated a readily observable characteristic of markets of 
reacting quickly (and from the standpoint of some, brutally) to relevant information. And 
there should be no doubt that the release of reliable information concerning emissions 
covered by a cap-and-trade program is highly relevant. The cap is always known, but 
until aggregate emission data is released no one has a really good idea of what aggregate 
emissions are, much less of how much emission reduction or abatement is required to 
comply with the cap. The same phenomenon was observed in the US SO2 emissions 
trading program when the first auction revealed emissions and the implied demand for 
allowances to be much less than expected (Ellerman et al., 2000).  In the case of the EU 
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ETS, a similar adjustment of expectations concerning CO2 emissions and the implied 
demand for EUAs occurred in response to the release of these data. Anyone doubting the 
adjustment in expectations need only refer to the headline of the guest editorial in Point 
Carbon’s April 21 edition of Carbon Market Europe— “CO2 price still too low”—and 
note the absence of such articles since the end of April.  While the obvious explanation of 
the price break in late April is an adjustment of expectations, EUA prices did not go to 
zero and they have remained, even after the most recent adjustment, at a level that 
approximates the high end of the initially predicted price range.      
III. Do the 2005 Data Reveal Over-allocation?  
A. A Working Definition of Over-allocation  
 
Over-allocation is not a well defined concept. The choice of words implies that too 
many allowances were created, but the standard by which “too many” is to be determined 
is rarely stated. Moreover, over-allocation tends to be conflated with being long, that is, 
having more allowances than emissions. Since any market presumes buyers and sellers 
and in an allowance trading system the former will be short and the latter long, it cannot 
be the case that everyone is short. Making sense of over-allocation requires both a 
standard of reference and some understanding of the reasons that some installations are 
short and others long. 
Two standards of reference can be imagined. The first is what emissions would have 
been without the trading system, what can be called the counterfactual, and is termed 
BAU (for Business as Usual) emissions in modeling exercises. Probably all would agree 
that handing out more allowances than BAU emissions would constitute over-allocation. 
And if such were true, there would of course be no constraint and no market unless 
participants were poorly informed about the relationship between the cap and the 
counterfactual. A second standard of reference could be a cap that is constraining, that is, 
less than the counterfactual, but still judged not sufficiently ambitious. For instance, if the 
desired degree of ambition were a 5% reduction of emissions from the counterfactual, 
and allowances were distributed such as to require only a 2% reduction, the 3% 
difference might be considered over-allocation. While this second definition is plausible 
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and seemingly the one intended in much of the current debate, we argue that it would be 
better to reserve the term “over-allocation” for the first definition to which all can agree.  
Installations, or any aggregation of installations, such as a sector, member state, or 
even the system as a whole, can be long or short for a number of reasons other than 
“over-allocation.” One of the most obvious is the very incentive that motivates trading, 
differences in the marginal cost of abatement. For any given allocation that is equitable 
and constraining, those installations with lower cost of abatement would be expected to 
reduce emissions in order to free up allowances to sell to installations that face higher 
costs of abatement. Such desired behavior would show up in reported installation data, as 
that released in May 2006, as data points that are both long and short according to the 
marginal cost of abatement at the covered installations.  
A second reason for the appearance of a long position is uncertainty, the fact that the 
future is rarely what is expected. Supposing again an initial equitable and constraining 
allocation, it is inevitable that some installations will produce more than expected and 
others less. The consequences in an emissions trading system are that the former will be 
short and the latter long. It ought not to be argued that the installations that are long 
because they produced less than expected, and therefore had lower emissions, were over-
allocated, unless one is prepared to argue that short installations were “under-allocated.” 
Given uncertainty, the only way to overcome such over- and under-allocation would be to 
adjust allowances ex post, which would remove at least some of the incentive to abate. 
The effects of uncertainty are not limited to the components of an aggregate. To the 
extent that economic activity, weather or any other factor affecting emissions deviates 
from what is expected, counterfactual emissions will be higher or lower than expected 
and any given cap will be more or less constraining with consequent effects on the 
positions of all the components. Since stochastic disturbances will tend to have a greater 
effect at the installation level, short and long positions will still occur but the proportions 
will change.  
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B. Presentation of the 2005 Data  
 
With these considerations in mind, it is useful to look at the data for the sums of 
differences between emissions and allocations at the installation level for various 
aggregates. Figures 2 and 3 do this for the EU as a whole and for the constituent member 
states both in absolute and relative terms.  In both of these figures, the data are portrayed 
as the sum of the differences for all the installations having long and short positions, 
respectively as “gross long” and “gross short.” Each aggregate then has either a “net 
long” or a “net short” position indicated by the bold color and equal to the difference 
between the “gross long” and “gross short” data points for that aggregate. 
Figure 2. Short and long positions by Member State in percent 
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Figure 3. Short and long positions by Member State in MtCO2 
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Figure 2, where the differences are expressed as percentages of the total allocation to 
installations constituting the aggregate, is the more instructive display of the information 
for the purposes of developing some measure of over-allocation. Lithuania can serve as 
an example of evident over-allocation. No installation was short and the difference 
between total emissions and total allowances allocated to installations was slightly over 
50% of 2005 emissions. While over-allocation seems evident, figuring out how much 
would be difficult since it is quite possible that the levels of economic activity in 
Lithuania were not what was expected, that Lithuanian installations may have abated, or 
that some other factor may explain some or all of the long position.  
At the other extreme is the UK where installations were both long and short, but the 
extent to which installations were short was much greater than the corresponding figure 
for installations that were long such that emissions were 18% greater than the allocation. 
Clearly, the UK as a whole cannot be considered to have been over-allocated even if 
some firms and sectors may be long. Also, the short position may be created, not so much 
by intention, but by higher levels of economic activity than expected or other unexpected 
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events, such as high natural gas prices, created a larger number of short positions. Still, 
these two cases illustrate the point that subject to the qualifications we have noted, it 
would be as hard to argue that the UK was “over-allocated” as it would be to argue that 
Lithuania was not.  
Having set up two polar cases, Figure 2 illustrates the great diversity among the EU 
member states. As indicated by the top bar, the situation of the EU as a whole is 
balanced, but the member states fall roughly into four categories. The first includes those 
like Lithuania where all or nearly all the installations are long and by a considerable 
amount. This group comprises the first nine member states from the top in Figure 2. In 
addition to having no or few installations that were short, the long position is in excess of 
15% of the total allocation. The next three member states, Hungary, Sweden and France, 
constitute a second group that are similar in having significant long positions, between 
10% and 15% of the allowance allocation, but with more short installations, especially in 
Sweden.  The third group consists of the next five member states—Holland, Germany, 
Belgium, Slovenia, and Portugal—that are long on balance but by relatively modest 
amounts that would fall well within what might be expected as a result of a relative 
advantage in abatement or less favorable economic, meteorological, or other 
circumstances in 2005. The final group is of course the six member states who were on 
balance short: Greece, Austria, Italy, Ireland, Spain, and the UK.  
While Figure 2 is the more helpful of these two diagrams for evaluating the presence of 
over-allocation, Figure 3 is necessary to put the phenomenon in perspective and it 
provides a good picture of the main sources of demand and potential supply of EUAs in 
the market in 2005. The gross shorts, totaling 180 MtCO2, are located mostly (80%) in 
four countries: the UK, Spain, Italy, and Germany. The same four countries, plus France 
and Poland, constitute the largest part of the potential sellers’ side of the market with 
approximately 150 of the 250 MtCO2 allocated to installations that were not needed to 
cover their emissions in 2005, or about 60% of the total. Many of the trades were 
undoubtedly within the same countries, but there were also net transfers of EUAs among 
member states and borrowing from the 2006 allocation. An analysis conducted by the 
Italian registry of the trading patterns of Italian companies and the origin of surrendered 
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permits revealed that 7.8 million of the 43.3 million EUAs by which Italian installations 
were short were covered by borrowing and that 7.0 million of surrendered EUAs were 
initially issued to installations outside of Italy (Point Carbon News, Oct. 30, 2006). Thus, 
66% of the gross short position of Italy was covered by redistribution of EUAs among 
installations in Italy, 18% by borrowing from the installations’ forward allocation, and 
16% by purchases outside of Italy. 
The net positions displayed in Figures 2 and 3 imply transfers of allowances among 
member states although internal borrowing would also be a possibility. The net balances 
imply that 60% of the demand for international trading came from the UK with another 
18% from Spain, 16% from Italy and the remaining 6% from Ireland, Austria, and 
Greece. The potential suppliers were more evenly distributed with Germany, Poland, and 
France accounting for about half of the total. The analysis by the Italian registry indicates 
that 74% of Italy’s net short position of 9.5 million EUAs was covered by purchases from 
abroad and the remainder by within-country borrowing. The remaining 5.4 million tons 
of borrowed EUAs substituted for purchases or transfers from other installations within 
Italy.    
Member states are not the only aggregates into which the installation data can be 
aggregated. Another break-out is by economic sector, as is done in Figures 4 and 5. By 
this grouping, the power sector is in the aggregate modestly short (by about 3%), while 
all the other sectors are long by more significant percentages. Among these industrial 
sectors, three—ceramics, bricks and tile; iron, steel and coke; and pulp and paper—are 
long by more than 15% of the allocation to these sectors. When placed in the perspective 
of the volume of emissions, as in Figure 5, the power sector dominates the potential 
market. Virtually all of the compliance demand for EUAs in 2005 came from the power 
sector, as well as about half of the total potential supply.    
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Figure 4. Short and long positions by EU-wide sectors 
-20 -10 0 10 20 30
TOTAL
Power and Heat
Refineries
Cement & Lime
Glass
Ceramics, Bricks & Tiles
Iron, Steel & Coke
Pulp & Paper
Percent
Net Short Net Long Gross Short Gross Long
 
Figure 5. Short and long positions by EU-wide sectors in absolute terms 
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When sector and regional classifications are combined, an even clearer picture of the 
implied redistribution of allowances is obtained. In Figure 6, the sectors are grouped into 
power and heat and all others (generically industry) and aggregated into regions defined 
as the EU 15 and the 8 East European accession states. The power and heat sector in the 
EU15 is the only player in the EU ETS that has been characterized by an overall net short 
position. More than half of the net length is located in Eastern Europe, although given the 
registry problems in Eastern Europe, most of the net short position of the EU15 power 
and heat sector was probably covered by purchases from the EU15 industrial sectors.  
Figure 6. A breakdown of short and long positions by major sectors and regions 
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C. A Measure of Over-allocation 
 
A measure of the likelihood of over-allocation can be calculated from this data based 
on the earlier discussion of what might cause long positions. Any aggregate of 
installation data will typically show the group to be either long or net on balance and to 
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have some component long and others short. For each, a ratio can be calculated from the 
net position in relation to the corresponding long or short position, such as indicated 
below.  
ShortorLongGross
ShortorLongNetRatioNet =  
To take our earlier examples, Lithuania would have a ratio of +1.0 since it was long 
and its net long position is identical to its gross long position. Conversely, the UK has a 
ratio of -0.72 since its net short position is 72% of the sum of the amounts by which all 
short installations were short. By definition, the net ratio is limited to values between -1.0 
and +1.0 with negative numbers indicated that the aggregate or member state is short 
over-all and positive values indicating the opposite.  
A negative net ratio suggests that no obvious over-allocation has taken place. Sectors 
within a member state may be over-allocated, but if the member state as a whole is not, 
the over-allocation is compensated by an implied under-allocation to other sectors. While 
such differentiation can create problems for sectors that compete across national 
boundaries, this differentiation can be regarded as an internal matter not significantly 
different from other forms of assistance or regulatory treatment that may advantage or 
disadvantage a sector relative to competitors in other countries. 
Member states that have positive ratios would need to be divided into two groups 
depending on where the line is drawn for indicating over-allocation. The first sub-group 
would be those with a high positive ratio indicated few installations that were short. This 
leaves a second group with a net ratio that is positive but not excessive. There is no a 
priori answer concerning where to draw the line between these two groups, but the data 
clusters in a manner that allows some to be clearly assigned to one group or the other. 
Figure 7 represents the distribution of allowances by member states expressed as a 
percentage of the EU25 allocation according to their net ratios. The part of the columns 
labeled “base” represents emissions that were covered by allocated allowances. The blue 
parts of the columns labeled “purchase” indicate emissions that were greater that the 
allocation for those member states with a net ratio from -1.0 to zero. The red parts of the 
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columns labeled “for sale” indicate allocated allowances in excess of emissions for those 
countries with a net ratio between 0 and +1.  
Figure 7. Distribution of EUAs by Net Ratio 
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The UK and Ireland, representing about 12 % of the overall EU25 allocation, are the 
two countries characterized by the shortest positions and a net short that is approximately 
2% of all the EUAs issued by the EU25. The next four countries – Spain, Italy, Austria, 
and Greece – account for about 25% of total EUAs and they are all short but less so than 
the UK and Ireland.  On the side of the longs, Belgium and Portugal, have relatively 
balanced positions not unlike the previous four on the short side of the ledger. Germany’s 
size will cause the category in which it falls to dominate all the others and so it is for the 
group with net ratios between +0.4 and +0.6, which constitutes almost one third of the 
total allocation. The next two groups, with net ratios higher than +0.6 include the member 
states for which the evidence of over-allocation is much stronger. They constitute about 
29% of the EU25 total and their combined surplus is about 5%.  
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Where to place the threshold for what might be considered a presumption of over-
allocation is obviously a difficult decision. It should be drawn at a relatively high net 
positive ratio for the reasons explained earlier and even then other factors should be 
considered before coming to a definitive conclusion. The important point is not that there 
were some member states for which over-allocation is indicated, but that there were so 
many for which that was not the case. Even with a relatively low presumptive threshold 
for over-allocation of +0.60, eleven member states that distributed 71% of all EUAs 
cannot be viewed as involving over-allocation. And for the 29% remaining, about 24% of 
the allowances were required to cover emissions in 2005 so that the net potential over-
allocation is on the order of 5% or 100 million EUAs, assuming that none of the length 
can be attributed to abatement or unexpected conditions that create length in 2005 but 
could not be expected to do so in the future.  
Whatever the correct magnitude of this estimate, it needs to be placed in context. First, 
it is not necessarily a complete indicator of the over-all length of the EU ETS at this point 
in time since the allowances reported are those distributed to installations in 2005. It does 
not include many of the allowances in reserves for new entrants, auctions, or other 
purposes that had not been distributed by the end of 2005. While these reserves are not 
specifically reserved for any single year, most of them will become available before the 
end of 2007. If the three-year total for all EUAs is divided by three, another 85 million 
EUAs are indicated as 2005 allowances not yet distributed. A second observation 
concerns the greater over-allocation that was avoided by the cuts that the Commission 
required from a number of first period NAPs. These totaled 290 million EUAs, 
approximately equal on an annual average to the potential over-allocation indicated by an 
analysis of the 2005 data. Finally, over-allocation indicates very little about abatement or 
the reduction of emissions that is the fundamental object of the EU ETS. We now turn to 
this second part of the question that we pose in the title to this paper.   
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IV. Has the EU ETS reduced CO2 emissions?  
A. Some initial considerations 
 
Just as being long or short is a difference between emissions and allocation, so 
abatement is a difference between emissions and the counterfactual, or what CO2 
emissions would have been in the absence of the EU ETS. And, while the first difference 
can be readily deduced from two observable data points, the second difference can never 
be determined with certainty because the counterfactual is not observed and never will 
be. It can only be estimated, but there are better and worse estimates and much can be 
done to narrow the range of uncertainty, particularly when the evaluation is done ex post 
when the levels of economic activity, weather, energy prices and other factors affecting 
the demand for allowances are known.  
In the case of the EU ETS, forming a good estimate of the counterfactual is 
complicated by the lack of historical data corresponding to the installations included in 
the scheme. Reasonably good data exist for the CO2 emissions of the EU member states, 
however the EU ETS includes only a part—ranging from 30% to 70%—of each member 
state’s emissions. And, prior to the start of the EU ETS, there was no reason to collect or 
to publish data on sectors or installations that were to constitute the EU ETS. One not 
entirely satisfactory source for of the data for these installations is that collected to 
establish an historical “baseline.” All the member states collected recent emissions data 
in the process of developing the first set of National Allocation Plans during 2004 in 
order to establish an initial point for projecting what emissions were expected to be in 
2005-07 for the trading sector as a whole and for specific industrial sectors and for 
allocating allowances to the installations included in the scheme.  While this data source 
provides a much needed reference point, it suffers from two problems: potential bias and 
imperfect comparability.  
The potential bias in the data arises from the process by which the data were collected. 
As described in Ellerman, Buchner and Carraro (forthcoming), the data collection effort 
was largely a voluntary submission by the industries involved and it was conducted under 
severe time pressures that did not allow for as much verification as could be desired. 
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Cooperation in submitting the data is reported as good, perhaps not surprisingly since 
allowance allocations would depend on the data submitted; but for that reason there was 
also an incentive to resolve uncertainties in favor of higher emissions. While this 
incentive clearly existed, its role should not be exaggerated. The government officials 
cross-checked the data submitted with other information that was often available, as well 
as checking it for internal consistency. Also, a certain degree of internal discipline could 
be expected within the process from firms who would not be indifferent to inflated claims 
by competitors. The important point is not that these data should be accepted as is, or 
rejected out-of-hand, but that the extent of bias be measured or at least taken into 
account. It would be wonderful if there were other more reliable data that could be used, 
but in its absence, the baseline data is all that exists to enable an estimate of the extent to 
which the EU ETS met its primary objective of reducing CO2 emissions.   
The second problem with the baseline data is that the components to be summed across 
the EU are not fully comparable. Although all member states sought a measure of recent 
emissions in developing their baselines, the definitions varied. For all, it was an average 
of recent years ending with 2003, the last year for which data was available, but the years 
included in the average varied from two to six. Moreover, special provisions were 
sometimes adopted that let minimum observations be dropped, as in the UK, or for more 
recent 2004 data to be used instead of the historical average, as in the Czech Republic. 
Nevertheless, there are presently no other data and the historical baseline data have the 
merit of reflecting relatively recent years (e.g. around 2001-2003) for the installations in 
the EU ETS. As with the problem of bias, the solution is not to throw out the baseline 
data but to understand and to measure the errors that may be created by incomplete 
comparability.  
B. Verified emissions compared to baseline emissions 
 
With these significant qualifications in mind, we now present the historical baseline 
data in comparison with corresponding data on allowances and verified emissions. 
Historical emissions must not be thought of as the counterfactual for 2005; it is the 
starting point before taking account of changes that would have occurred between the 
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historical reference point and the year of the counterfactual, as we will do in the next 
section. Figure 8 provides the comparison on a country-specific basis. In each cluster, the 
historical baseline is the right-hand column, the 2005 allocation, the center column; and 
verified emissions, the left hand column.  
Figure 8. Comparison of 2005 emissions with base period emissions 
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 Source: Own calculations based on data from the CITL, the EC, and DEHSt (2005).  
There are six different combinations in which verified emissions, allowances, and 
baseline emissions can be combined as shown in the table below. 
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Table 2.  Allowance, Emissions, and Baseline Relations 
Combination Countries % of Allocation Combination Countries 
% of 
Allocation 
Allowances less than Baseline Allowances more than Baseline 
E < A < B Belgium 
Germany 
Netherlands 
Hungary 
32% E < B < A Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Luxemburg 
Portugal 
Sweden 
Czech Rep 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Poland 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
33% 
A < E < B UK 10% B < E < A Estonia 1% 
A < B < E Italy 
Ireland 
11% B < A < E Austria 
Greece 
Spain 
13% 
 Source: Derived by authors from CITL data. 
Member states can be divided into two groups: those will allowance totals less than 
baseline emissions (7 member states with 53% of allowances) and those with the opposite 
relation (16 member states with 47% of allowances). The former would be countries who 
expect emissions to decline from baseline levels, such as the UK, or that have challenging 
Kyoto targets for which they are preparing, such as Italy and Ireland. The latter group 
typically includes those who do not appear likely to have difficulty in meeting their 
Kyoto obligation and for which emissions are expected to grow from historical baseline 
levels, such as the countries in Eastern Europe. The majority of EU15 member states also 
fall into this category, even some who face significant problems meeting their Kyoto 
obligations. Whatever the relation between the allowance total and baseline emissions, 
verified emissions may be lower than allowances and baseline emissions (16 countries 
with 65% of allowances) and which are all long in the 2005 data, higher than both (5 
countries with 24% of allowances) and which are all short, or between the two (2 
countries with 11% of allowances).  
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Figure 9 presents these country-specific data points summed into a whole for the EU23 
and for the regional distinction between the EU15 and the 8 East European accession 
states (subsequently EE8).  
Figure 9. 2005 emissions, base period emissions and total allowances: a regional 
breakup  
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 Source: Own calculations based on data from the CITL, the EC, and DEHSt (2005).  
For the EU23, verified emissions are 3.4% less than baseline emissions and the 
corresponding percentages for the EU15 and the EE8 are -2.4% and -7.8%.  In these three 
aggregated comparisons, the middle column representing allowances indicates the 
allowances distributed directly to installations by the solid color. The hatched area at the 
top of each column indicates the difference between the number of allowances distributed 
to installations in 2005 and one-third of the three-year total for these aggregates. These 
are allowances that have been reserved for auctions, new entrant or early action reserves, 
or other special provisions. Most of these reserved allowances were not distributed in 
2005, but most of them will be issued before the end of 2007. It is to be noted that when 
the reserves are included the over-all long position for the EU ETS in 2005 is 8% and not 
− 3.4% 
− 2.4% 
− 7.8% 
Over-allocation or Abatement?  22 
November 9, 2006 
 
the 4% figure that is based on the distribution to installations. This extra length has 
definite implications for the price of EUAs, but for the purpose of determining abatement 
in 2005 that extra length is not relevant although it may be for abatement in 2006 and 
2007 to the extent that prices decline as a consequence and have an effect on abatement.  
C. Changes in real output and carbon intensity since 2002 
 
The comparison of verified emissions with the baseline in the preceding section does 
not take account of factors that would influence the level of CO2 emissions between 2002 
and 2005. Continuing GDP growth, or more specifically in growth in the output of the 
sectors included in the EU ETS, would be expected to causes emissions to increase and 
for the 2005 counterfactual to be higher than the historical baseline. Also, CO2 emissions 
typically do not grow at the same rate as real output because of the observed, long 
standing tendency towards improved carbon intensity for most economies. In addition to 
these trend factors, there are a number of unpredictable conditions, such as the weather 
and energy prices, that will increase or decrease counterfactual emissions and the demand 
for allowances depending on their realization relative to the initial expectation.   
Economic growth since 2002 has been relatively robust in the EU and particularly in 
the East European accession states as shown in Figure 10 where a constant price index 
for GDP in Europe in relation to the year 2002 is depicted. For the EU as a whole, GDP 
has grown by almost 6 percent by 2005 compared to 2002. The figure is slightly lower 
for the EU15 where most of the economic activity occurs and significantly higher, +15 
percent, for the Eastern European countries.  We use 2002 as an approximate center point 
for the baseline emissions although for some countries with longer baseline periods, it 
might more appropriately be earlier.  
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Figure 10. GDP growth in the European Union 
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 Source: Own calculations based on IMF data.  
GDP reflects a broader definition of economic activity than what is included in the EU 
ETS, but the same pattern obtains when more sector–specific indices of economic 
activity are used, as shown by Figure 11. 
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Figure 11. Indicators of economic activity in the EU25 (2002-2006) 
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 Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data.  
These indices shown monthly activity since the beginning of 2002 through mid-2006 
and each series is normalized to its average value in 2002. All of these indices indicate 
higher levels of real output in 2005 than in 2002. The two most important series, 
electricity and industrial output excluding construction are about 5.5% and 4.0% above 
the average 2002 level of output. More specific, industrial sector indices show increases 
of about 6% for cement, 5% for pulp and paper, 3% for iron and steel, and 2.3% for glass, 
bricks, tiles, and ceramics. Temporary declines in output of iron and steel and of pulp and 
paper can be observed in 2005, but these were temporary and the output levels observed 
as of mid-2006 for all sectors are higher than in 2005.  
Since CO2 emissions typically do not increase at the same rate as broad indicators of 
economic activity, some estimate of the improvement in CO2 intensity must be taken into 
account in estimating a counterfactual for 2005. Because of the paucity of industry-
specific data on carbon intensity, we examine first the trends in carbon intensity for the 
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economy as a whole for the EU and its constituent parts and then consider whether the 
economy-wide data can be considered representative of the EU ETS sectors based on the 
sector specific data that is available.  
Table 3 provides a comparison of the annual rates of growth for real GDP, CO2 
emissions, and the implied change in CO2 intensity between 1995-2000 and 2000-2004 
for the EU23, the EU15 and the EE8. Real GDP growth has been less in recent years than 
in the last half of the 1990s but the recent rate of increase in CO2 emissions has been 
greater than in the earlier period. The inescapable result is that the rate in improvement in 
CO2 intensity slowed noticeably around 2000. These trends are especially pronounced in 
the EU15, but they are also true for the new East European member states. CO2 intensity 
is still improving, especially in Eastern Europe, has diminished sufficiently that the CO2 
emissions are increasing at a faster rate than they were in the late 1990s despite slower 
growth in real GDP. 
Table 3. Trends in Real GDP, CO2 emissions, and CO2 intensity 
  1995-2000 2000-2004 
Real GDP +2.9% +1.8% 
CO2 Emissions +0.1% +1.0% EU23 
CO2 Intensity -2.7% -0.8% 
Real GDP +2.8% +1.6% 
CO2 Emissions +0.4% +1.1% EU15 
CO2 Intensity -2.3% -0.5% 
Real GDP +4.3% +3.6% 
CO2 Emissions -1.8% +0.2% EE8 
CO2 Intensity -5.8% -3.3% 
Source: CO2 emissions from EEA (2006a). Own calculations for GDP based on IMF data weighted 
at 2004 PPP values. Intensity calculated.  
This slowing in the rate of decline in CO2 intensity since 2000 raises an obvious 
problem with extrapolating the declines in carbon and energy intensity experienced 
during the 1990s beyond 2000. For the purpose of establishing a counterfactual for 2005, 
we assume that the trend prevailing since 2000 is the appropriate one. Economy-wide 
CO2 emissions data are available for two of the three years between 2002 and 2005 and 
nothing in the data for 2005 suggests that the trend has reversed. In fact, given the 2004 
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data and the increase in real output between 2004 and 2005, a return to the 2002 
emissions level (without the EU ETS) would imply a one-year improvement in carbon 
intensity on the order of 6%, which is outside the range of historical experience.  
The critical issue with the use of economy-wide data is whether it is representative of 
the sub-set of the economy that the EU ETS comprises. Fortunately, data is available that 
can help resolve this dilemma. Eurostat publishes data on the energy intensity of the EU 
economy as a whole and of industry as distinct from transportation, households, 
agriculture, etc. While energy intensity is not identical with CO2 intensity, it is an 
important determinant. Table 4 presents that comparison.  
Table 4. Annual rates of improvement in European energy intensity  
 Rate of improvement in 
the economy’s energy 
intensity 
Rate of improvement in 
the industry’s energy 
intensity 
 1995-2000 2000-2004 1995-2000 2000-2003 
EU25 -1.9 -0.5 -1.6 -0.1 
EU15 -1.4 -0.4 -1.0 0.2 
Austria -1.6 2.2 -0.5 1.8 
Belgium -0.2 -3.0 -0.3 -0.4 
Denmark -3.0 -0.9 -2.9 0.3 
Finland -2.1 1.1 -2.4 -0.7 
France -1.3 -0.2 - - 
Germany -1.8 -0.1 -1.4 -0.3 
Greece -0.4 -2.2 -1.5 -5.3 
Ireland -3.9 -2.6 - - 
Italy -0.6 0.3 1.1 -0.3 
Luxembourg -4.5 1.0 -6.6 -5.1 
Netherlands -2.8 0.6 -0.5 1.7 
Portugal 0.4 -0.2 1.5 2.1 
Spain -0.1 -0.5 0.1 1.9 
Sweden -3.8 0.3 -3.5 -3.8 
UK -1.9 -2.2 -1.3 0.6 
Cyprus 0.1 -1.8 1.8 -2.9 
CZ -1.6 -1.0 -5.1 -3.9 
Estonia -6.8 -1.5 -9.6 -5.9 
Hungary -3.8 -2.8 -6.7 -2.3 
Latvia -4.8 -2.0 -3.8 -4.4 
Lithuania -5.7 -1.5 -7.6 -0.9 
Malta -1.1 -0.9 - - 
Poland -5.9 -3.1 -7.5 -3.7 
Slovakia -3.5 -2.7 -2.3 0.4 
Slovenia -2.8 -0.9 -0.8 -1.2 
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  Source: Eurostat and own calculations.  
While the industry data do not extend to 2004, it is evident that for the EU as a whole, 
the trends observed for energy intensity in the economy wide aggregates are true for the 
industrial sector. The same break in trend around 2000 can be observed in energy 
intensity for the industrial sectors and for the economy as a whole for the EU25 and the 
EU15, as well as for fifteen of the twenty-five member states. For the ten member states 
with highlighted figures in Table 4, a trend to increasing energy efficiency can be 
observed in either the economy-wide or industry figures rates of change. However, when 
aggregated to the EU25 or EU15 level, the data is consistent with a trend to less 
improvement in carbon intensity since 2000. Moreover, the rates of improvement in 
energy intensity for the industrial sectors are generally not as great for the economy as a 
whole and the slowdown in improvement is more pronounced for the industrial sectors 
than for the economy as a whole.  
A second source of data on emissions has been recently released by the European 
Environmental Agency in its annual assessment of progress towards the Kyoto goals 
(EEA, 2006b). It provides indices of GHG emissions for industry excluding construction 
through 2004 that permit comparison of late 1990s trends with the years since 2000. 
Again, GHG emissions are not the same as CO2 emissions, but the latter constitute most 
of the former. These data series show the same break in emissions trends around 2000 
and rising GHG emissions between 2002 and 2004.  
Based on these two sources of data that are more directly applicable to the EU ETS 
sectors, we believe that it is unlikely that the trends in CO2 intensity that were evident 
through 2004 for the EU economies as a whole were not also broadly true for the EU 
ETS sectors. Given the observed increase in real output for the EU ETS sectors, it is very 
unlikely that CO2 emissions from the installations included in the scheme would have 
declined in the absence of the EU ETS and the significant price that was paid for CO2 
emissions in 2005.  
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D. Estimating the Counterfactual and Abatement  
 
Figure 12 summarizes the problem of estimating the counterfactual and thereby 
determining the amount of CO2 emission reduction that was effected by the EU ETS in 
2005. There are two data points: the imperfect baseline emissions, which we take to 
reflect approximately 2002 emissions of the EU ETS installations, and verified emissions 
in 2005. The critical issue is: What would have been the rate of change in BAU emissions 
in the absence of the EU ETS?   
Real GDP and the relevant sector-specific indicators of economic activity indicate 
annual growth of about 2% for the EU as a whole. While the decline in carbon intensity 
since 2000 has been significantly less than what was experienced in the 1990s, it has not 
stopped so that 2% annual growth in counterfactual CO2 emissions would seem to be an 
upper limit that would also take account of the effect of the generally adverse weather 
conditions in 2005 and the effects of higher natural gas prices on counterfactual 
emissions and the demand for EUAs.  Given the growth in real GDP and the post-2000 
trend in CO2 intensity, it is unlikely that the lower limit on the feasible growth of BAU 
emissions would be less than one percent. Accordingly, it appears likely that 
counterfactual emissions increased to a level that in 2005 would have been from 3% to 
6% higher than the level of emissions for the EU ETS installations in 2002. The two 
arrows in Figure 12 represent these two limiting assumptions about the growth of CO2 
emissions absent the EU ETS, given what we can now observe concerning the growth in 
real output in the EU ETS sectors, the post-2000 trend in CO2 intensity, and the evolution 
of CO2 emissions through 2004. 
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Figure 12. A scenario for BAU emissions in the absence of the EU ETS 
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Assuming for the moment that the baseline emissions accurately reflect 2002 emissions 
for the EU ETS installations, these limiting assumptions imply that the counterfactual lies 
between 2.14 and 2.21 billion tons of CO2. Since verified emissions are 2.01 billion tons, 
the indicated reduction of CO2 emissions is between approximately 130 and 200 million 
tons, or 7% to 10% of what emissions would otherwise have been. However, the 
assumption of an accurate baseline is open to serious challenge because of the less than 
ideal conditions under which the baseline data on installation level emissions were 
collected. These conditions undoubtedly produced errors, but errors operate in both 
directions. The more serious concern in estimating a counterfactual is the likelihood of 
bias, which would imply that the errors are disproportionately and systematically in one 
direction. To the best of our knowledge, no one has done the empirical work to prove the 
bias or to develop a better estimate of the level of historical emissions for the EU ETS 
installations prior to 2005 or of counterfactual emissions in 2005. In any case, the critical 
issue is: What is the magnitude of bias?  Or to turn the question around: How much bias 
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would have to be assumed to support a conclusion of no abatement of CO2 emissions by 
EU ETS installations in 2005? 
One way of addressing this question is to take a country-specific approach to 
estimating counterfactual emissions that allows a distinction to be made among member 
states in adjusting baselines. The primary distinction would be between the new 
accession countries of Eastern Europe and the EU 15. For the former, historical data were 
of poor quality and of questionable relevance given the ongoing rapid structural change 
in those economies. Consequently, there was a greater tendency to rely on projections 
instead of historical data in allocating allowances at the installation level. Generally, 
these conditions did not exist among the EU15 or nearly to the same degree. Accordingly, 
it is plausible that more bias exists in the baselines of the East European states than in 
those of the EU15. 
To develop the alternative estimate of the counterfactual, we take the reported baseline 
emissions (without adjustment) and assume that CO2 emissions in the EU ETS sectors 
increased at an annual rate that is the product of the annual increase in observed real GDP 
between 2002 and 2005 and the rate of decline in CO2 intensity that was experienced 
between 2000 and 2004 for each country.  That calculation and the resulting data are 
provided in detail in Annex VI and summarized in the first panel of Table 5.  
Table 5. A country-specific approach to calculating emission reductions 
 Baseline 
Emissions 
(Mt CO2) 
2005 BAU 
Emissions  
(Mt CO2) 
Verified 
Emissions 
(Mt CO2) 
Indicated 
Reduction 
(Mt CO2) 
Percent 
Reduction 
Without adjustment of baseline emissions 
EU23 2,078 2,150 (+3.5%) 2,007 -144 -6.7% 
EU15 1,677 1,729 (+3.1%) 1,637 -93 -5.4% 
EE8 401 421 (+4.8%) 370 -51 -12.1% 
With adjustment of baseline emissions 
EU23 1,946 (-6.4%) 2,014 (+3.5%) 2,007 -7.6 -0.4% 
EU15 1,593 (-5.0%) 1,642 (+3.1%) 1,637 -5.5 -0.3% 
EE8 353 (-12.0%) 370 (+4.8%) 370 -0.2 -0.1% 
 Source: Own calculations based on data from CITL, DEHSt (2005), EEA (2006a) and IMF.  
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The indicated growth in counterfactual emissions for the EU15 and EE8 between 2002 
and 2005 is 3.1% and 4.8%, respectively, or 3.5% for the EU as a whole. The indicated 
abatement is nearly 145 million tons or 7% with percentage reductions of 5.4% for the 
EU15 and 12.1% for the eight East European member states.  
The greater proportionate reduction in the East than in the West seems unlikely. There 
probably was some abatement in the East, and no doubt cheaper abatement opportunities 
exist there than in the EU15; but firms in Eastern Europe are less attuned to market 
opportunities than those in the EU15; and, if they are, they would have been impeded 
from trading by the delays in final approvals of several NAPs and in setting up the East 
European registries. A more likely explanation is that the baseline emissions for the East 
European countries contain more bias than those of the EU15. Accordingly, the second 
panel repeats the same calculation concerning growth of emissions that was made in the 
first panel but from baselines that have been lowered by percentages that would be 
required to sustain a conclusion of no abatement in the EU15 and EE8. The implied 
adjustments are 5% for EU15 countries and 12% for the eight new accession members. 
Both of these seem unlikely to us as estimates of cumulative, systemic bias, although 
undoubtedly errors of this magnitude will exist in the data for individual installations or 
small sub-sets.  
Until better estimates based on more detailed country- and sector-specific research 
have been done, it is not possible to make a reliable estimate of abatement. Nevertheless, 
it is unlikely that there was no abatement in 2005. It is also unlikely that the abatement 
was as much as 200 million tons. The tentative calculations presented in Table 5 would 
suggest 140 million tons adjusted downward by however much is the bias in the baseline 
emissions data. An amount half this much—abatement of slightly over 3%—seems not 
unreasonable, but it is arbitrary and must remain so until better data and more careful 
assessments can be made.  
In the meantime, the refutable presumption must be that the EU ETS succeeded in 
abating CO2 emissions in 2005 based on three observations.  
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1. A Positive EUA Price. A significant price is being paid for CO2, 
which reason suggests would have the effect of reducing 
emissions as firms adjust to this new economic reality. 
2. Rising Real Output. Real output in the EU has been rising at the 
same time that the rate of improvement in CO2 intensity has been 
declining, which has led to rising CO2 emissions before 2005.  
3. Historical Emissions Data that indicate a reduction of emissions 
even after allowing for plausible bias.  
 
The amount of emission reduction in 2005 may be modest, but so is the ambition of the 
1st period cap. Given the problems of getting the system started and the changes in 
management and regulatory practice implied, even a modest amount of abatement may 
seem surprising, but the available evidence makes it hard to argue that there was none. 
V. Concluding Comments 
 
The question posed in the title to this paper is whether the 2005 emissions data reveal 
over-allocation or abatement. Any reasonable answer to this question will acknowledge 
that both have occurred and this paper has attempted to develop estimates of the 
magnitude of both.  
Over-allocation has the unfortunate attribute of depending on the eye of the beholder, 
especially when viewed ex post. Nevertheless, there are plausible, empirical measures 
that can be developed. The one that we suggest is the ratio of an aggregate’s net long 
(short) position to the sum of the long (short) positions of that aggregate’s components. 
When some sizeable aggregate is long on balance and this ratio is close to unity, the 
likelihood of over-allocation is high. As we have noted, there are circumstances that 
would produce a high ratio without over-allocation, so that the presumption of over-
allocation can be refuted if such circumstance can be convincingly shown. It is also 
possible that the over-allocation was intentional, as was arguably the case for the 
industrial sectors included in the EU ETS, in which case the attribute is the reflection of 
some equity consideration. Our analysis based on the application of the net ratio indicates 
that over-allocation occurred and that its magnitude may have been as much as 100 
million EUAs.    
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Whatever the extent of over-allocation, that estimate does not say much about 
abatement. In a trading system, it is not the allocation to an installation that causes a firm 
to reduce emissions, but the price that it must pay, even if in opportunity cost, for its 
emissions. Whatever one thinks of the allocation in the first period, there can be no doubt 
that a price was paid and a cost incurred for CO2 emissions emitted by covered 
installations in 2005. Therefore, the question can be posed: What was the effect of this 
price? The data to answer this question are not nearly as good as they should be, but our 
analysis of what is available indicates that CO2 emissions were reduced by an amount 
that was probably larger than 50 million tons and less than 200 million tons.  
These very tentative estimates of over-allocation and abatement have important 
implications. If abatement was at least 50 million tons, more than half (and perhaps all) 
of the long position revealed for the EU as a whole by the 2005 emissions data cannot be 
attributed to over-allocation. If over-allocation has occurred, even if on the order of 100 
million tons, the clear implication is that EUA prices are lower because of the over-
allocation, assuming those EUAs have found (or will find) their way to the market.  
This reasoning raises the interesting question of what was the source of the surprise 
that caused EUA prices to drop so sharply when the 2005 emissions data were revealed in 
April and May of 2006. It cannot have been the total number of allowances which had 
been known since at least mid-2005 when the last first period NAP was approved. 
Moreover, that total included whatever “over-allocation” had occurred and all observers 
recognized that this cap was not very demanding. The surprise concerned the revealed 
level of emissions. One plausible explanation is that market observers had over-estimated 
the level of CO2 emissions and the demand for allowances caused by rising real output, 
the adverse weather in 2005, and the higher prices for natural gas relative to coal. But, 
another more intriguing possibility is that market observers under-estimated the amount 
of abatement that would occur in the first year of the EU ETS as the managers of affected 
facilities incorporated CO2 prices into their production decisions. When revealed to be 
wrong, an under-estimate of abatement would have the same effect on EUA prices as an 
over-estimate of counterfactual emissions. Our analysis suggests that such an under-
estimate is a distinct possibility. Moreover, experience with emissions trading regimes in 
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the U.S. has shown that unexpected abatement always occurs. And it is unexpected 
because abatement is so often conceived as resulting only from large machines that 
engineers can design and regulators mandate and not from the small, incremental changes 
in production and production processes that managers of existing facilities make in 
adjusting to new economic realities. These pedestrian changes can cumulatively make a 
perceptible difference and they are one of the main reasons for choosing market-based 
instruments, such as the EU ETS.  
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Appendix I: An overview on the situation in each member state 
Gross Short Gross Long Net Short / Net Long  
Allocation 
2005 
t CO2 
Verified 
emissions 
2005 
t CO2 
Total 
number of 
installations t CO2 % installations t CO2 % 
install
ations t CO2 % 
Installations 
where 
allowances=
emissions 
TOTAL 1,995,439,047 1,916,174,516 10,046 180,359,321 9.0 2,903 259,623,852 13.0 6,800 79.3 4.0 343 
Austria 32,414,872 33,372,841 203 3,311,430 10.2 78 2,353,461 7.3 122 -1.0 -3.0 3 
Belgium 58,312,155 55,354,096 308 9,986,382 17.1 73 12,944,441 22.2 235 3.0 5.1 0 
Denmark 37,303,720 26,475,718 381 132,605 0.4 59 10,960,607 29.4 316 10.8 29.0 6 
Finland 44,657,504 33,099,660 600 461,390 1.0 185 12,019,234 26.9 327 11.6 25.9 88 
France 150,393,692 131,257,908 1086 4,218,956 2.8 178 23,354,740 15.5 895 19.1 12.7 13 
Germany 494,951,117 474,005,179 1850 25,256,328 5.1 605 46,202,266 9.3 1,239 20.9 4.2 6 
Greece 71,135,034 71,250,370 140 5,324,854 7.5 68 5,209,518 7.3 72 -0.1 -0.2 0 
Ireland 19,236,747 22,397,678 114 4,231,567 22.0 53 1,070,636 5.6 56 -3.2 -16.4 5 
Italy 215,799,016 225,335,126 955 28,453,211 13.2 538 18,917,101 8.8 404 -9.5 -4.4 13 
Luxembourg 3,229,321 2,603,349 15 0 0.0 0 625,972 19.4 15 0.6 19.4 0 
Netherlands 86,452,491 80,351,292 209 6,151,089 7.1 54 12,252,288 14.2 153 6.1 7.1 2 
Portugal 36,898,516 36,425,933 244 1,771,813 4.8 56 2,244,396 6.1 184 0.5 1.3 4 
Spain 172,130,788 182,893,568 827 34,816,872 20.2 221 24,054,092 14.0 573 -10.8 -6.3 33 
Sweden 22,281,227 19,315,482 705 3,171,150 14.2 204 6,136,895 27.5 436 3.0 13.3 65 
UK 206,025,867 242,464,097 779 50,927,842 24.7 348 14,489,612 7.0 344 -36.4 -17.7 87 
Cz Republic 96,910,587 82,454,636 395 168,911 0.2 42 14,624,862 15.1 352 14.5 14.9 1 
Estonia 16,747,054 12,621,824 43 14,832 0.1 2 4,140,062 24.7 40 4.1 24.6 1 
Hungary 30,236,166 26,027,616 235 1,178,982 3.9 49 5,387,532 17.8 185 4.2 13.9 1 
Latvia 4,070,078 2,854,424 96 23,834 0.6 12 1,239,488 30.5 78 1.2 29.9 6 
Lithuania 13,503,454 6,603,869 100 7,046 0.1 3 6,906,631 51.1 90 6.9 51.1 7 
Poland 143,140,900 115,057,531 488 549,754 0.4 34 28,633,123 20.0 454 28.1 19.6 0 
Slovakia 30,470,677 25,231,769 175 46,789 0.2 18 5,285,697 17.3 156 5.2 17.2 1 
Slovenia 9,138,064 8,720,550 98 153,684 1.7 23 571,198 6.3 74 0.4 4.6 1 
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Appendix II: An overview on each sector’s situation 
Gross Short Gross Long Net Short / Net Long 
 
Allocation 
2005 
t CO2 
2005 verified 
emissions  
t CO2 
Total 
number of 
installations t CO2 % t CO2 % t CO2 % 
POWER&HEAT          
EU23 1,170,783,068 1,198,708,781 3570 157,660,503 13.5 129,208,590 11.0 28,451,913 2.4 
EU15 935,411,200 998,243,257 2723 155,936,049 16.7 92,571,173 9.9 63,364,876 6.8 
EE8 235,371,868 200,465,524 847 1,724,454 0.7 36,637,417 15.6 -34,912,963 -14.8 
REFINERIES          
EU23 142,553,291 132,997,989 136 2,687,055 1.9 12,204,279 8.6 -9,517,224 -6.7 
EU15 137,067,072 128,756,423 126 2,687,055 2.0 10,959,626 8.0 -8,272,571 -6.0 
EE8 5,486,219 4,241,566 10  0.0 1,244,653 22.7 -1,244,653 -22.7 
IRON, STEEL & 
COKE          
EU23 159,638,364 127,241,724 235 1,816,331 1.1 34,203,974 21.4 -32,387,643 -20.3 
EU15 141,054,277 119,159,278 210 1,791,809 1.3 23,677,811 16.8 -21,886,002 -15.5 
EE8 18,584,087 8,082,446 25 24,522 0.1 10,526,163 56.6 -10,501,641 -56.5 
PULP&PAPER          
EU23 38,635,691 30,628,002 795 771,988 2.0 8,485,611 22.0 -7,713,623 -20.0 
EU15 35,629,925 28,734,717 720 762,395 2.1 7,387,681 20.7 -6,625,286 -18.6 
EE8 3,005,766 1,893,285 75 9,593 0.3 1,097,930 36.5 -1,088,337 -36.2 
CEMENT&LIME          
EU23 174,663,015 161,419,401 462 7,534,377 4.3 19,873,806 11.4 -12,339,429 -7.1 
EU15 155,051,883 147,237,414 399 7,464,191 4.8 14,374,475 9.3 -6,910,284 -4.5 
EE8 19,611,132 14,181,987 63 70,186 0.4 5,499,331 28.0 -5,429,145 -27.7 
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GLASS          
EU23 19,315,789 17,112,080 344 464,039 2.4 2,462,392 12.7 -1,998,353 -10.3 
EU15 17,127,707 15,407,853 297 450,383 2.6 1,934,143 11.3 -1,483,760 -8.7 
EE8 2,188,082 1,704,227 47 13,656 0.6 528,249 24.1 -514,593 -23.5 
CERAMICS, 
BRICKS&TILES          
EU23 16,430,329 13,257,432 1035 475,507 2.9 3,401,801 20.7 -2,922,327 -17.8 
EU15 13,662,675 11,090,958 868 427,983 3.1 2,721,570 19.9 -2,293,587 -16.8 
EE8 2,767,654 2,166,474 167 47,524 1.7 680,231 24.6 -628,740 -22.7 
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Appendix IIIa: An overview on the data used to derive GDP trends in each member state 
 Gross domestic product at constant market prices (Billions, National currency) 
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Austria 182.0 210.4 212.1 214.0 216.3 221.6 226.1 
Belgium 220.8 251.5 254.5 258.2 260.6 266.8 270.9 
Denmark 1124.1 1294.0 1303.1 1309.2 1318.2 1342.9 1386.2 
Finland 104.8 132.3 135.8 138.0 140.4 145.4 149.6 
France 1263.3 1442.5 1468.7 1485.0 1501.8 1532.3 1550.6 
Germany 1873.8 2062.5 2088.1 2088.3 2083.2 2109.2 2127.5 
Greece 79.9 94.7 99.5 103.3 108.2 113.3 117.4 
Ireland 76.2 121.0 127.9 135.6 141.5 147.6 155.7 
Italy 1083.8 1191.1 1212.4 1216.6 1217.0 1230.0 1229.6 
Luxembourg 16.3 22.0 22.6 23.4 23.9 24.9 25.9 
Netherlands 367.4 441.4 447.7 448.1 449.6 458.4 465.4 
Portugal 100.1 122.3 124.7 125.7 124.3 125.7 126.2 
Spain 515.4 630.3 652.6 670.1 690.2 711.5 735.9 
Sweden 1891.3 2217.3 2241.0 2285.7 2324.4 2411.5 2476.6 
UK 884.7 1035.3 1059.6 1081.5 1110.3 1146.5 1167.8 
Cz Republic 2031.1 2189.2 2242.9 2285.5 2367.8 2467.6 2617.8 
Estonia 70.9 92.9 98.9 106.1 113.2 122.0 134.0 
Hungary 10820.8 13272.2 13846.9 14375.4 14861.6 15637.1 16280.7 
Latvia 3.6 4.8 5.1 5.5 5.9 6.4 7.0 
Lithuania 37.1 45.8 48.8 52.1 57.6 61.6 66.2 
Poland 337.2 438.6 443.5 449.8 467.0 491.6 508.3 
Slovakia 785.6 941.3 971.7 1011.7 1053.8 1110.8 1178.8 
Slovenia 2404.6 2981.0 3060.2 3165.9 3249.8 3385.2 3516.2 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2006. 
Notes: Estimates start after 2005, except for Belgium, Finland, Hungary, Latvia and Poland where estimates start after 2004 
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Appendix IIIb: An overview on the data used to calculate GDP based on IMF data weighted at 2004 PPP values 
 2004 weights Country-specific indices at constant prices 
 
2004 GDP based on PPP 
valuation of country GDP 
(Billions, current intern. dollar) Region EU23 2002 2003 2004 2005 
EU 23 - - - 100.0 101.4 103.9 105.8 
EU 15 - 1.0000 0.9145 100.0 101.1 103.3 104.9 
EE 8 - 1.0000 0.0855 100.0 104.1 109.6 114.8 
Austria 263.3 0.0242 0.0221 100.0 101.1 103.6 105.7 
Belgium 313.5 0.0288 0.0263 100.0 100.9 103.3 104.9 
Denmark 179.4 0.0165 0.0151 100.0 100.7 102.6 105.9 
Finland 156.3 0.0144 0.0131 100.0 101.8 105.3 108.4 
France 1758.9 0.1616 0.1478 100.0 101.1 103.2 104.4 
Germany 2440.4 0.2242 0.2050 100.0 99.8 101.0 101.9 
Greece 234.9 0.0216 0.0197 100.0 104.8 109.7 113.7 
Ireland 155.9 0.0143 0.0131 100.0 104.3 108.8 114.8 
Italy 1627.0 0.1495 0.1367 100.0 100.0 101.1 101.1 
Luxembourg 30.1 0.0028 0.0025 100.0 102.0 106.4 110.7 
Netherlands 487.6 0.0448 0.0410 100.0 100.3 102.3 103.9 
Portugal 197.4 0.0181 0.0166 100.0 98.9 100.0 100.4 
Spain 1028.8 0.0945 0.0864 100.0 103.0 106.2 109.8 
Sweden 257.0 0.0236 0.0216 100.0 101.7 105.5 108.4 
UK 1753.3 0.1611 0.1473 100.0 102.7 106.0 108.0 
Cz Republic 175.8 0.1727 0.0148 100.0 103.6 108.0 114.5 
Estonia 20.2 0.0198 0.0017 100.0 106.7 115.0 126.3 
Hungary 160.2 0.1574 0.0135 100.0 103.4 108.8 113.3 
Latvia 26.4 0.0260 0.0022 100.0 107.2 116.5 128.4 
Lithuania 44.3 0.0435 0.0037 100.0 110.5 118.2 127.0 
Poland 469.4 0.4611 0.0394 100.0 103.8 109.3 113.0 
Slovakia 80.6 0.0791 0.0068 100.0 104.2 109.8 116.5 
Slovenia 41.0 0.0403 0.0034 100.0 102.7 106.9 111.1 
Source: Derived from the authors from IMF. 
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Appendix IV: CO2 emissions excluding net CO2 from LULUCF (CO2 equivalent, Gg) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
EU23 3,935,715 4,041,282 3,978,984 3,982,571 3,939,944 3,950,391 4,024,554 4,001,167 4,089,716 4,106,598 
EU15 3,283,298 3,361,793 3,310,521 3,354,289 3,331,210 3,355,237 3,420,438 3,415,643 3,484,853 3,505,887 
EE8 652,417 679,489 668,463 628,283 608,734 595,154 604,116 585,524 604,863 600,711 
Austria 63,655 67,321 67,146 66,828 65,435 66,178 70,171 71,935 77,553 77,077 
Belgium 123,632 127,762 122,272 127,933 122,911 123,986 124,110 123,311 126,974 126,907 
Denmark 60,450 73,967 64,464 60,403 57,532 53,070 54,669 54,262 59,454 53,941 
Finland 58,105 63,916 62,609 59,233 58,845 57,113 62,563 65,043 73,099 69,115 
France 392,983 406,682 400,834 421,272 411,141 405,647 409,263 404,706 412,090 417,353 
Germany 920,155 943,608 914,700 906,672 881,685 886,258 899,301 886,480 892,545 885,854 
Greece 87,426 89,623 94,361 98,966 98,141 103,963 106,210 105,905 109,914 110,280 
Ireland 34,783 36,081 38,504 40,306 42,136 44,241 46,704 45,701 44,519 45,266 
Italy 445,384 438,843 443,056 454,031 459,051 463,311 469,062 470,821 486,126 489,590 
Luxembourg 9,276 9,390 8,681 7,705 8,437 8,952 9,227 10,226 10,702 11,997 
Netherlands 170,694 178,100 171,627 173,100 167,779 169,680 175,113 174,853 178,178 180,675 
Portugal 53,131 50,258 53,543 58,234 64,894 63,762 65,018 69,250 64,600 65,705 
Spain 255,724 242,993 262,655 270,747 296,302 307,673 311,552 330,551 333,837 354,562 
Sweden 58,206 61,713 57,127 57,624 54,771 53,503 54,245 55,401 56,469 55,360 
UK 549,695 571,537 548,942 551,236 542,151 547,901 563,230 547,198 558,792 562,204 
Cz Republic 132,125 133,863 138,389 129,188 122,099 129,017 129,033 124,040 128,075 127,297 
Estonia 19,315 20,264 20,225 18,318 16,771 16,849 17,103 17,312 19,106 19,232 
Hungary 60,870 62,220 60,478 60,139 60,015 57,803 59,360 57,703 60,461 59,149 
Latvia 8,802 9,081 8,535 8,157 7,550 6,907 7,410 7,331 7,477 7,485 
Lithuania  24,384 21,477 18,570 15,663 14,884 14,105 13,326 12,704 12,287 13,350 
Poland 348,172 372,530 361,626 337,448 329,697 314,373 317,844 308,277 319,082 315,234 
Slovakia 14,908 15,666 15,978 15,722 15,088 15,177 16,145 16,212 16,012 16,464 
Slovenia 43,841 44,389 44,662 43,649 42,630 40,924 43,896 41,945 42,362 42,498 
Source: European Environmental Agency (2006), Annual European Community greenhouse gas inventory 1990–2004 and inventory report 2006, EEA 
Technical report No. 6/2006, Copenhagen. 
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Appendix Va: Energy intensity of the economy  
(Gross inland consumption of energy divided by GDP at constant prices, 1995; kgoe per 1000 Euro) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
EU 25 230.4 235.0 227.6 224.2 214.9 208.8 209.7 206.5 207.6 204.9 
EU 15 205.4 209.4 202.7 201.0 195.7 190.5 191.4 188.4 189.5 187.5 
Austria 145.8 151.0 148.2 144.8 139.6 134.4 142.8 139.9 149.0 146.1 
Belgium 238.6 252.3 249.0 248.8 244.0 236.1 228.1 213.6 217.4 208.2 
Denmark 146.9 161.7 146.5 140.7 132.1 125.0 126.6 123.8 126.1 120.3 
Finland 290.6 302.4 299.1 288.9 276.0 260.1 263.8 272.2 280.1 272.1 
France 199.7 209.3 198.6 197.7 191.0 186.6 188.3 186.1 188.5 185.5 
Germany 175.2 179.2 174.2 170.2 163.9 159.7 162.5 158.7 161.0 158.8 
Greece 268.5 276.1 268.3 272.7 262.5 263.6 260.6 258.0 247.8 240.4 
Ireland 217.0 213.4 201.7 196.8 187.7 175.1 172.5 166.1 155.2 156.9 
Italy 192.4 190.1 189.0 191.4 190.9 186.9 184.0 184.1 189.2 189.1 
Luxembourg 241.2 238.0 216.5 197.9 192.9 186.6 190.7 196.7 181.8 194.3 
Netherlands 231.2 233.2 221.3 211.7 202.1 198.5 200.7 201.1 202.2 203.2 
Portugal 237.3 228.6 233.2 239.2 247.4 241.5 243.9 254.7 234.7 239.6 
Spain 228.7 220.3 222.7 223.6 227.0 227.0 225.4 226.3 219.7 222.5 
Sweden 265.5 268.4 255.4 248.5 238.2 215.0 228.9 224.3 217.1 217.5 
UK 251.5 256.1 242.0 242.7 234.3 227.3 223.7 214.5 212.1 207.2 
Cz Republic 965.8 952.1 969.5 946.5 868.4 888.4 883.9 875.8 891.2 851.8 
Estonia 1835.2 1863.4 1659.2 1495.3 1398.1 1214.8 1273.0 1153.2 1179.1 1140.2 
Hungary 740.6 747.5 700.5 661.9 642.0 600.5 588.6 579.6 566.6 534.1 
Latvia 994.4 921.3 793.3 740.5 840.9 756.0 816.5 750.3 725.1 696.3 
Lithuania 1691.7 1735.2 1531.8 1592.4 1372.2 1208.4 1256.8 1272.7 1194.8 1135.6 
Poland 962.8 972.9 878.5 792.3 730.2 680.2 673.5 654.2 623.1 596.6 
Slovakia 1155.4 1051.8 1055.8 997.6 976.5 955.9 1015.8 976.0 929.6 854.3 
Slovenia 397.3 402.0 388.4 371.8 348.1 341.7 349.6 344.6 341.1 329.2 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Appendix Vb: Energy intensity of industry (index 1995 = 100) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
EU 25 100 100.2 98.5 94.9 91.6 91.8 91.4 90.2 91.6 
EU 15 100 99.9 98.8 96.6 95 95.2 95.4 94.2 95.9 
Austria 100 100.7 109.4 105.9 97.1 97.5 95.5 100 102.7 
Belgium 100 95.5 97.2 98.6 100.7 98.5 97.8 91.9 97.3 
Denmark 100 100.7 95.9 93.4 90.7 85.3 87.6 87.1 86 
Finland 100 98 98 94.8 95.6 88.2 84.6 86.5 86.3 
Germany 100 100.3 94.4 92.8 90.2 92.8 90.5 90.1 92.1 
Greece 100 102.6 104.6 99.3 91.3 92.4 87.8 85.3 77.7 
Italy 100 99 101.3 98.6 105.2 105.6 100.8 101.2 104.7 
Luxembourg 100 95.1 80.9 66.3 68.8 67.2 62.7 58.7 57 
Netherlands 100 102.4 101.6 99 94.3 97.7 96.6 96.5 102.7 
Portugal 100 97 101.7 105.4 105.9 107.5 121.4 114.3 114.2 
Spain 100 95 99.4 98.2 92.5 100.3 102.6 103.6 105.9 
Sweden 100 99.9 95.6 90.9 84.8 82.5 76.8 74.6 73.1 
UK 100 100.9 100.1 96.1 97.6 93.7 97.3 92.2 95.4 
Cz Republic 100 90.4 93.2 91.6 72.6 74.6 74.3 68.9 65.8 
Estonia 100 106 84.1 70 55.4 51.8 53.1 41.7 42.7 
Hungary 100 102.5 86 79.7 71.5 66.6 67.6 68.7 62 
Latvia 100 156.2 144.3 101.9 93.8 81.1 77.8 74.5 70.3 
Lithuania 100 89 86.5 76 66.8 62.1 56.8 58.1 60.4 
Poland 100 99.7 89.6 75.6 64.2 62.6 58.7 57.1 55.6 
Slovakia 100 86.1 89.4 82.6 79.7 88.6 91 93.1 89.6 
Slovenia 100 95.7 92.3 85.8 85.3 95.9 85.4 80.4 92.4 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Appendix VI: An overview of the data relevant for member state abatement  
 
Base period 
emissions  
Mt CO2 
Observed 
annual GDP 
growth rate 
of 2002-2005 
Assumed annual 
rate of change of 
carbon intensity 
2000-2004 
Implied  
annual rate of 
increase of 
CO2 
Counterfactual 
2005 BAU 
emissions  
Mt CO2 
Verified 
emissions 
2005 
Mt CO2 
Difference 
BAU-2005 
emissions 
Mt CO2 
Difference 
BAU-2005 
emissions 
% 
EU23 2,078.0 - - 1.1% 2150.1 2006.6 -143.5 -6.7% 
EU15 1676.6 - - 1.0% 1729.3 1636.6 -92.7 -5.4% 
EE8 401.4 - - 1.6% 420.7 370.0 -50.8 -12.1% 
Austria 30.2 1.9% +2.2% 4.0% 34.0 33.4 -0.7 -2.0% 
Belgium 63.0 1.6% -0.9% 0.7% 64.4 55.4 -9.0 -14.0% 
Denmark 30.9 2.0% -0.5% 1.4% 32.2 26.5 -5.8 -17.9% 
Finland 36.2 2.8% +1.8% 4.6% 41.5 33.1 -8.4 -20.2% 
France 141.1 1.5% -0.8% 0.6% 143.8 131.3 -12.5 -8.7% 
Germany 501.0 0.6% -0.6% 0.1% 501.8 474.0 -27.8 -5.5% 
Greece 70.1 4.6% -3.3% 1.2% 72.7 71.3 -1.5 -2.0% 
Ireland 20.9 4.9% -4.7% 0.3% 21.1 22.4 +1.3 +6.3% 
Italy 224.0 0.4% +0.5% 0.9% 229.9 225.3 -4.6 -2.0% 
Luxembourg 2.9 3.6% +3.0% 6.5% 3.5 2.6 -0.9 -25.8% 
Netherlands 89.5 1.3% +0.6% 1.8% 94.5 80.4 -14.2 -15.0% 
Portugal 36.6 0.1% +0.0% 0.2% 36.8 36.4 -0.4 -1.0% 
Spain 164.1 3.3% +0.1% 3.3% 181.2 182.9 +1.7 +0.9% 
Sweden 20.2 2.8% -1.3% 1.4% 21.1 19.3 -1.8 -8.5% 
UK 245.9 2.7% -2.0% 0.7% 250.8 242.5 -8.4 -3.3% 
Cz Republic 89.0 4.8% -3.4% 1.4% 92.9 82.5 -10.4 -11.2% 
Estonia 12.4 8.8% -4.4% 4.3% 14.1 12.6 -1.5 -10.5% 
Hungary 32.0 4.4% -3.7% 0.7% 32.7 26.0 -6.6 -20.3% 
Latvia 3.7 9.5% -6.0% 3.4% 4.1 2.9 -1.2 -30.3% 
Lithuania 9.0 9.0% -9.2% -0.2% 8.9 6.6 -2.3 -26.2% 
Poland 219.8 4.3% -2.9% 1.5% 229.6 205.4 -24.2 -10.5% 
Slovakia 26.5 5.5% -2.4% 3.0% 29.0 25.2 -3.8 -13.0% 
Slovenia 9.0 3.7% -2.4% 1.3% 9.4 8.7 -0.6 -6.8% 
Notes: Polish data assumed according to footnote 3. Base period data from DEHSt (2005); GDP growth rate based on own calculations of weighted GDP; 
carbon intensity figures derived from EEA data on CO2. 
